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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 970555-CA

JAMES DEITER,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from two convictions for possession of
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, one a third degree
felony and one a second degree felony.

This Court has

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(e)(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to support a

determination that defendant possessed a "firearm" where two
police officers testified that they saw defendant holding a
rifle, where moments before defendant had stated to the 911
operator that if anyone came into his home, he would "put some
holes" in them or "shoot" them, and where two .22 caliber
bullets were later found on defendant's dresser?
1

A criminal conviction will be reversed for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so
inherently improbable that ^reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed
the crime."

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah

1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983),
superseded on other grounds. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191
(Utah 1987)) .
2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying

defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that the
error it had admittedly committed in limiting crossexamination of a witness was not harmful?
"The decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of
discretion with the trial court and will not be reversed
absent a clear abuse of that discretion."
712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985).

State v. Williams,

In general, an appellate court

"will presume that the discretion of the trial court was
properly exercised unless the record clearly shows the
contrary."
1984).

Goodman v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah

To constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial

court's determination must be "beyond the limits of
reasonability."

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah

1992).
3.

Did the trial court properly refuse to instruct the

jury on compulsion, defense of habitation, and force in
2

defense of a person, where the only factual predicate for
giving such instructions was that one night defendant heard a
noise on his porch or at his front door that prompted him to
call 911?
A trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction
presents a question of law, which an appellate court reviews
under a correction of error standard.

State v. James, 819

P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1996), governing possession
of dangerous weapons by restricted persons, provides in
pertinent part:
(2)(a) Any person who is on parole or
probation for a felony may not have in his
possession or under his custody or control
any dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-10-501.
(b) Any person who violates this
subsection is guilty of a third degree
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a
firearm, explosive, or incendiary device
he is guilty of a second degree felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 (1996), supplying definitions
for the weapons part of the Code, provided:
(d) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that
in the manner of its use or intended use
is capable of causing death or serious
bodily injury. The following factors
shall be used in determining whether a
knife, or any other item, object, or thing
not commonly known as a dangerous weapon
is a dangerous weapon:

3

(i) the character of the instrument,
object, or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound
produced, if any;
(iii) the manner in which the
instrument, object, or thing was
used; and
(iv) the other lawful purposes for
which the instrument, object, or
thing may be used.

(g) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver,
shotgun, sawed-off shotgun, rifle or
sawed-off rifle, or any devise that could
be used as a dangerous weapon from which
is expelled a projectile by action of an
explosive.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, one a third degree
felony and one a second degree felony, arising out of
incidents that occurred on two different dates in late 1996
(R. 1-2). Defendant was tried by a jury, found guilty as
charged, and sentenced to one term of zero-to-five years and
an additional concurrent term of one-to-fifteen years, both in
the Utah State Prison, with credit for time served in jail (R.
106-07).

Following the trial court's denial of several post-

trial motions, defendant filed this timely appeal (R. 162-65,
164A).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Rifle

Incident

At two a.m. on October 20, 1996, the 911 operator in Box
4

Elder County received a telephone call from defendant (R. 261,
263).

Defendant identified himself, gave his address,

reported that he was in his bedroom, and told the operator
that he thought someone had come through the front door into
his home (R. 264). The operator testified that defendant told
her that if anyone "came through the door after him he would
put some holes in them" (Id.).

She further testified:

He said that I didn't need to send anyone
out, that he just wanted, for the record,
[sic] that if he went out of the bedroom
into the front room and at that point
there was someone there, he would shoot
them; and that he was in fear for his life
at that point.
Id.

The dispatcher sent two officers to defendant's home.

Drawing an inference from defendant's statements, the
dispatcher

told the officers that defendant had a gun (R.

266-67).
Five minutes later, the officers arrived at defendant's
home (R. 327). Officer Beard testified: "When I approached,
Mr. Deiter came out and he had a semi-automatic rifle in the
port arms position. . . . I instructed Jim to put the gun
away, at which time he put it inside the door, leaned it up
against a wall" (R. 328). When asked to describe the rifle,
Officer Beard, a gun collector as well as a long-time trap
shooter and hunter, replied: "It appeared to be a semiautomatic .22 with a blued barrel, blue receiver, wood forearm
and wood stock" (R. 329). Officer Ricketts, who was riding
5

with Officer Beard that night, also testified that defendant
was holding a rifle (R. 360, 375).
After talking briefly with defendant, the officers
checked the area.

Finding no one, they left the premises (R.

328-29).
The Bow and Arrow

Incident

On December 3, 1996, Adult Probation and Parole agent
Dale Smith, along with defendant's supervising agent and a
third officer, visited defendant at his home (R. 376-77).

At

that time, Smith found a compound hunting bow with a 65-pound
draw weight, painted in camouflage colors, in defendant's
bedroom, next to his bed (R. 385) . Smith testified that he
"noticed that there was an arrow in [the bow], meaning that
the notch of the arrow was on the draw string.

The arrow was

laying on the - I think it's called a rest on the bow" (R.
383).

The agent further described the location of the bow and

arrow within the bedroom:
The bow was leaning against this bed table
which was directly next to the bed. . . .
The pointed end of the arrow was pointed
away, the feathered end of the arrow was
pointing towards the bed. From laying in
bed, it was as you would hold it.
(Id.).

Agent Smith testified that the loaded bow was within

arm's reach of the bed (Id.).

In addition, Smith observed a

second arrow leaning up against the night stand (R. 386). He
also found two .22 caliber shells on top of the dresser in
6

defendant's bedroom (R. 422).
Based on this evidence, after 55 minutes of deliberation,
the jury convicted defendant, as charged, of two counts of
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person (R.
94, 514) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant first claims that the evidence was insufficient
to prove that he possessed a "firearm" because there was no
proof that the rifle he was holding was actually operable. At
the outset, this issue may be waived because defendant has
failed to adequately brief it or to marshal the evidence in
support of the verdict.

On the merits, the argument fails

because the statute defining "firearm" contains no requirement
that a rifle must be operable to be so defined.

In addition,

defendant's interpretation would contradict the purpose of the
statute as articulated by the Utah Supreme Court.
statute is

When the

properly interpreted, the evidence plainly

supports the verdict.
Next, defendant claims that the trial court committed
reversible error in refusing to allow a witness to be
questioned about whether he had given defendant permission to
possess a hunting bow.

In denying defendant's motion for a

new trial on this ground, the trial court agreed that it had
erred but found the error harmless.
error worked defendant no harm.
7

Indeed, on the facts, the

The rejected testimony, which

ultimately was elicited at sentencing, proved to be equivocal
at best.

Had it come in at trial, it would have fallen well

short of establishing that the witness gave defendant
permission to possess the bow under the circumstances of this
case, thus providing defendant with a possible defense to the
charge of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person.
Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court
improperly refused to give his requested jury instructions on
compulsion, force in defense of a person, and defense of
habitation.

In essence, defendant asserts that his fear of

someone entering his home provided him with defenses that
relieved him, as a restricted person, of the prohibition
against possessing a dangerous weapon.

As to compulsion, the

jury had before it no evidence to suggest that defendant's
possession of the rifle was in any way coerced.

As to the

instructions addressing force in defense of a person and
defense of habitation, by their very terms they apply only to
the use or threatened use of force, neither of which is
relevant to the possession charge at issue here.

Because

defendant's requested instructions had no factual

or legal

relevance to his case, the trial court properly rejected them.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
WHEN THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF
"FIREARM" IS PROPERLY
INTERPRETED, THE JURY'S
CONCLUSION THAT DEFENDANT WAS
UNLAWFULLY IN POSSESSION OF A
DANGEROUS WEAPON, TO WIT, A
FIREARM, IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that he possessed a "firearm," an essential element of
the second degree felony of which he was convicted (Br. of
App. at 10).* He grounds this argument on the assumption that
in order to qualify as a "firearm," a weapon must be capable
of "expel[ling] a projectile by means of an explosion."

Utah

Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2) (g) . Defendant's argument fails
because he has misinterpreted the controlling statute.

When

properly read, the statute provides ample support for the
conclusion drawn by the jury that defendant was unlawfully in
possession of a dangerous weapon; to wit, a firearm.
Section 76-10-503(2)(a) prohibits a convicted felon on

1

At the outset, this claim may be disposed of on the basis
of inadequate briefing. Defendant has failed to muster any legal
support for his position. Indeed, his argument on this point is
devoid of even a single case citation. See, e.g., State v.
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Wareham, 772
P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). In addition, he has failed to marshal
the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, another
prerequisite for appellate review. See, e.g. State v. Chavez,
840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah App. 1992) cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948
(Utah 1993).
9

parole or probation from possessing a dangerous weapon.
Section 76-10-503 (2) (b) penalizes such conduct as a third
degree felony, "but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm . .
., he is guilty of a second degree felony.
76-10-503(2) (b) (1996) .

Utah Code Ann. §

Section 76-10-501(2) (g), defining

"firearm," provides:
(g) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver,
shotgun, sawed-off shotgun, rifle or
sawed-off rifle, or any device that could
be used as a dangerous weapon from which
is expelled a projectile by action of an
explosive.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2) (g) (1996).

The gravamen of

defendant's complaint is that the trial court misinterpreted
the statutory definition of firearm (Br. of App. at 10). He
thinks that the phrase "from which is expelled a projectile by
action of an explosive" modifies the six enumerated weapons
(R. 300-02).

In essence, then, under defendant's

interpretation, a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-off
shotgun, rifle or sawed-off rifle would only be considered a
"firearm" if the State proved that it was actually capable of
expelling "a projectile by action of an explosive."
Defendant's argument fails on the plain language of the
statute.

See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850

n.14 (Utah 1994) (explaining that statutory language is the
first source of statutory interpretation); Brinkerhoff v.
Forsvth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989) (where statutory
10

language is plain, appellate court will look no further).

On

its face, the firearms statute lists six weapons that are
explicitly defined as firearms: a pistol, revolver, shotgun,
sawed-off shotgun, rifle or sawed-off rifle.
Ann. § 76-10-501 (2) (g) .

See Utah Code

The definition ends with a catch-all

provision, phrased in the alternative: "or any device that
could be used as a dangerous weapon from which is expelled a
projectile by action of an explosive."

Id.

Thus, if the item

is not one of the six enumerated weapons but possesses the
characteristics delineated in the catch-all provision, it will
be categorized as a firearm.
Defendant imposes an interpretation on this statute that
is contrary to the grammatical structure of the statute.

At

the outset, he separates the opening phrase of the catch-all
provision, "or any device that could be used as a dangerous
weapon," from its modifier, "from which is expelled a
projectile by action of an explosive."
11.

See Br. of App. at 10-

He then applies the modifier to the six enumerated

weapons.

This interpretation plainly violates the grammatical

structure of the statute.
In addition, the statutory intent underlying section 7610-503 (2) (d), defining "dangerous weapon," mandates against
defendant's interpretation of "firearm" as only an operable
explosive weapon:

11

The argument that a gun is only a
dangerous weapon when it is loaded and
ready to be fired was rejected by this
Court in State v. Nielsen, Utah, 544 P.2d
489 (1975), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 906
(1976), where we said that "the statute's
purpose was to deter those convicted of
violent crimes from thereafter having
guns, loaded or unloaded" 544 P.2d at 490.
State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 1985).

Consequently,

given the statute's purpose, whether a dangerous weapon is
loaded or unloaded is irrelevant.

Similarly, because a

firearm is definitionally a dangerous weapon, whether the
weapon is operable or inoperable must also be irrelevant.
When the term "firearm" is properly interpreted, the
evidence plainly suffices to support the jury's verdict.

See

State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989) ("Where there
is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from it, from which findings of all the elements of the
crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is
complete and we will sustain the verdict"), cert, denied, 494
U.S. 1090 (1990).
In the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury had
before it the following evidence.

Defendant called the 911

operator at 2 a.m. and reported that he was fearful that
someone was breaking into his home (R. 264). He stated that
he "would put some holes" in the person and that he "would
shoot them" (R. 264-65, 280-81).

The operator inferred from

these statements that defendant had a gun and, if necessary,
12

would use it (R. 266).

When the officers arrived at

defendant's home, they saw him on the lighted porch with a
rifle in his arms, thus confirming the dispatcher's inference
(R. 328, 330, 360, 375) .2 Six weeks later, when searching
defendant's home during a parole visit, an Adult Probation and
Parole officer found two .22 caliber shells on the top of
defendant's dresser in his bedroom (R. 422).
Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer
that defendant was in possession of a firearm; to wit, a
rifle, on October 20, 1996.3

Thus, the evidence was

sufficient to support his conviction for the second degree
felony of possession of a dangerous weapon, a rifle, by a
restricted person.

2

Defendant states that "neither officer could say that it
was a rifle beyond a reasonable doubt" (Br. of App. at 10). This
statement is incorrect. While neither officer could testify
definitively as to the specific kind of rifle in defendant's
possession, they both stated unequivocally that what they saw was
a rifle. Compare R. 355, 369 with R. 328-29, 375.
3

In addition, based on defendant's references to
"shooting" and "putting holes" in intruders, a jury could
reasonably infer that the rifle was operable. Thus, even under
defendant's proposed interpretation of "firearm," the evidence
was sufficient to convict him.
13

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT AN
ERROR IN LIMITING CROSSEXAMINATION OF A WITNESS WAS NOT
HARMFUL
Defendant claims that the trial court committed
reversible error when it refused to allow cross-examination of
Dale Smith, an Adult Probation and Parole agent, about whether
he had authorized defendant to possess a bow and arrows (Br.
of App. at 12). The trial court, in responding to defendant's
motion for a new trial on this ground, admitted that the
ruling was incorrect, but found the error harmless.
denying defendant's motion, the court explained:
Upon review of the arguments, the Court
is persuaded that its ruling at trial was
in error in preventing counsel from asking
the question. However, the error does not
work the harm which Defendant alleges in
his motion, in part because Defendant's
motion mischaracterizes the testimony of
Dale Smith. At the sentencing hearing on
June 3, 1997, Dale Smith was sworn and
examined by defense counsel. The Court
has reviewed a transcript of that
testimony. Dale Smith did not admit that
he ever authorized and consented for the
Defendant to possess a bow and arrows.
The Defendant's arguments in this regard
are erroneous. Dale Smith's answer, under
oath, was equivocal. He stated he did not
recall ever giving such permission. Such
testimony would not establish that
Defendant had been given permission.
The strongest testimony Defendant had
concerning the question of permission, was
14

In

Defendant's father, Nelson Deiter, who
testified at the sentencing hearing that
Agent Smith had given permission for
possession of a bow and arrows. The Court
made no ruling at trial prohibiting
Defendant from placing Nelson Deiter on
the stand and providing such testimony.
The Defendant chose not to call Mr. Nelson
Deiter as a witness. Inasmuch as any
testimony which would have been received
from Dale Smith at trial was at best
equivocal, and inasmuch as Defendant was
not prohibited from calling Nelson Deiter,
who would have provided the much stronger
evidence, the Court believes no reversible
error has occurred.
R. 163 or addendum A.
Defendant initially argues that this ruling denied him
his sixth amendment right to confrontation (Br. of App. at
12).

By failing to raise this concern before the trial court,

however, defendant denied that court any opportunity to
adjudicate it.

"With limited exceptions, the practice of this

court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for
the first time on appeal."

Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of

Educ., 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990).

"Utah's appellate

courts have applied this rule to constitutional questions
advanced for the first time on appeal."
820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991).

State v. Archambeau,

Where defendant has

asserted neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances, he
has waived consideration of the confrontation clause issue
before this Court.

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311

(Utah 1987) .
15

Defendant's remaining argument seems to be that the trial
court's restriction on the questioning of Agent Smith,
compounded by its refusal to give defendant's requested jury
instruction defining "dangerous weapons," precluded him from
presenting his theory of the case.

That is, if Agent Smith

had given defendant permission to possess a bow, then
defendant concludes he should not have reasonably known that a
bow was a dangerous weapon that he, as a restricted person,
could not possess (Br. of App. at 13).
This argument fails on the facts, as the trial court
ruled.

At trial, the state moved to preclude defense counsel

from questioning Agent Smith concerning permission to possess
the bow

unless the defense first laid appropriate foundation

for that line of questioning (R. 554-55).

In response,

defense counsel proffered that defendant's father had attended
a parole meeting seven or eight years ago at which Agent Smith
gave such permission (R. 556). The court subsequently ruled:
"I'll grant the motion, but if, as you have proposed, you
intend to put Mr. Nelson Deiter on and he provides that
testimony, I'll allow you to recall Agent Smith at that point,
because then there's foundation" (R. 559).
The defense never called Nelson Deiter to testify at
trial.

Instead, Nelson Deiter appeared at the sentencing

hearing, where he testified essentially as defense counsel had
earlier proffered (R. 584-85).

Dale Smith testified both at
16

trial and at the sentencing hearing.

At the latter, he stated

that he had been defendant's parole agent in 1983 and, at that
time, had met with defendant and his father to establish local
supervision based on a Pennsylvania conviction and parole
agreement (R. 596, 601-02).

He testified, in response to

leading questions, that he had no recollection of authorizing
defendant to have a bow thirteen years earlier, but that he
could possibly have done so (R. 597). He elaborated:
Regarding that specific probation
period, when I supervised him, that
specific probation agreement, I may have
said that he can have a bow and arrow. I
may have made some comments to him
regarding weapons, if they belonged to his
father and he didn't have access. But,
again, that was specifically [sic] to that
probation agreement, to that period of
time, not necessarily throughout all time.
(R. 600). Agent Smith then clarified the import of anything
he might have told defendant in 1983:
What I'm saying is I think an answer
that I gave him in 1983 cannot be used to
answer the same question after he's been
convicted of several other crimes and been
on parole and been in prison and had half
a dozen other probation agents. I don't
think a question which he asked a
probation agent in 1983 can apply to a
probation agreement in 1996.
(R. 603).
This testimony, as the trial court observed, was at best
equivocal (R. 163). Because defendant chose not to call
Nelson Deiter or defendant to testify at trial, Agent Smith's
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testimony would have been the only evidence going to the
question of permission to possess the bow.

Testimony that

Smith had no recollection one way or the other about giving
such permission would be insufficient to create a reasonable
doubt that he was guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon
by a restricted person.
Defendant takes his argument one step further.

Based on

Agent Smith's purported permission for defendant to possess
the bow in 1983 and defendant's alleged consequent ignorance
that the bow was a dangerous weapon, defendant asserts that
the jury was incorrectly instructed on the definition of
"dangerous weapon." See Br. of App. at 12-13.

Specifically,

defendant argues that the trial court erred in limiting its
"dangerous weapon" instruction to the statutory provision
defining items commonly known as dangerous weapons.
Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 928-29.

See

Instead, he thinks the jury

also should have been instructed concerning items not commonly
known as dangerous weapons (Br. of App. at 12-13).
This argument is misguided.

Jury instruction #7

provided: "You are instructed that a dangerous weapon is
defined as any item that in the manner of it's [sic] use or
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury" (R. 76). In opting for this instruction, which
mirrors the statutory definition applied to items commonly
known as dangerous weapons, the court observed: "With regards
18

to the compound bow, it depends on the evidence, but assuming
it's a compound bow that someone would use to kill an elk or
deer, I think it would be commonly known as a dangerous
weapon.

If it's a compound bow that kids use in their

bedroom, you have a different circumstance" (R. 296).
The instruction given by the trial court, while
precluding the need for any further instruction, also plainly
favored defendant.

By broadening the definition of dangerous

weapon to include items both commonly and not commonly known
as dangerous weapons, the trial court would only have given
the jury a greater opportunity to find that the bow was a
dangerous weapon.

Furthermore, the analysis applied to items

not commonly known as dangerous weapons would not have helped
defendant's case.

See Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 929 (items not

commonly known as dangerous weapons are considered dangerous
weapons "if, in considering the . . . enunciated
characteristics, they qualify").

Applying this analysis,

since the bow was not actually used and, consequently, no
wound was inflicted, only two characteristics would remain for
consideration.

First, the jury would consider the "character

of the instrument, object, or thing."
501(2)(d)(i).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-

This factor would leave the jury to ponder

whether a hunting bow designed to kill large mammals was of an
essentially dangerous character.

Second, the jury would

consider "the other lawful purposes for which the instrument,
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object, or thing may be used."
501(2) (d) (iv).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-

While the jury could speculate that one might

use a hunting bow for target practice or a costume accessory,
the evidence showed that the loaded bow was found within arm's
reach of defendant's bed, ready to shoot.
Because Agent Smith's equivocal testimony, coupled with a
broader jury instruction defining "'dangerous weapon," would
not have created a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for defendant, his claim fails.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON
COMPULSION, FORCE IN DEFENSE OF
PERSON, AND DEFENSE OF
HABITATION WHERE THESE DEFENSES,
BY THEIR TERMS, DID NOT APPLY TO
THE FACTS IN EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that he was improperly denied jury
instructions on the defenses of compulsion, force in defense
of a person, and defense of habitation.
76-2-302, 76-2-402, and 76-2-405.

See Utah Code Ann. §§

Had the jury been so

instructed, the burden would have shifted to the state to
refute these defenses beyond a reasonable doubt (Br. of App.
at 14-15).

Because this did not happen, defendant asserts

that the state's burden was "impermissibly eased," presumably
requiring reversal (id.).
Defendant's requested instructions were sought as
defenses against the charge of possession of a dangerous
20

weapon by a restricted person; to wit, a firearm.

In essence,

then, defendant asserts that his fear of someone entering his
home provided him with affirmative defenses that relieved him,
as a restricted person, of the prohibition against possessing
a dangerous weapon.
The court ruled on all three of the requested
instructions. As to compulsion, the court found the evidence
insufficient to support it:
I think there's probably few of us, if we
live long enough in life, that hasn't had
someone try to open our front door because
the person thought he was home. It's not
a good situation to approach him with a
shotgun or a rifle. So what I'm ruling
there is I don't think there was coercion
under the facts heard so far.
(R. 312). The court then added:
Secondly, I'm ruling that, as a matter of
fact, he doesn't have a right to have a
weapon like a firearm in the home in case
he does come under attack. I think that's
one of the rights he loses when he signs
the conditions of the parole agreement and
under the statute. So that will be
denied.
(Id.).

Next, rejecting instructions on both force in defense

of a person and defense of habitation, the court stated:

"He

has those rights [of using force in defense of a person or
habitation] as long as it is ^ot with a dangerous weapon" (R.
313).

Later, the court added: "One of his rights that has

been surgically removed from him for this period of time is
the right to have a firearm or a dangerous weapon.
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Except for

those, yeah, he has the other rights [to defend himself or a
third person or defend his habitation using force not
involving a dangerous weapon], but he's not being prosecuted
for anything else'7 (R. 316) .4 The court thus refused to give
the requested instructions, noting their lack of factual
relevance as well as the potential for unnecessarily confusing
the jury (R. 314, 316).
The trial court's decision not to give the requested jury
instructions was correct because, by their plain language, the
instructions could not serve as defenses to possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, the crime of which
defendant was convicted.
First, section 76-2-302, governing compulsion, provides
in pertinent part:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense
when he engaged in the proscribed conduct
because he was coerced to do so by the use
or threatened imminent use of unlawful
physical force upon him or a third person,
which force or threatened force a person
of reasonable firmness in his situation
would not have resisted.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1) (1996).

The offense from which

defendant seeks insulation is possession of a firearm.
However,

the jury had before it no evidence of any

4

The court elaborated: "For instance, if [defendant] had
the right to approach that door with bare knuckles, fists or a
night stick or something, he had the right to defend himself,
yes, but they're not going to hear any evidence about that so why
tell them that?" (R. 316) .
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"threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force" against
defendant.

Id.

Similarly, the jury had before it no evidence

that defendant possessed

the rifle out of compulsion.

The

facts simply showed that defendant heard a noise in the night
that made him fearful (R. 263-64).
observed by anyone (R. 328-29).

No intruder was ever

On these facts, a jury

instruction on compulsion was unwarranted.

Cf. State v.

Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988)(jury entitled to
have theory of case before jury if it would not be superfluous
because of absence of any evidentiary support).
Similarly, defendant's other two requested instructions,
by their plain language, were also inapplicable.

Section 76-

2-402, governing force in defense of person, begins with the
phrase, "A person is justified in threatening or using force
against another when. . . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1).

Section 76-2-405, governing defense of habitation, similarly
begins with the phrase, "A person is justified in using force
against another when and to the extent that. . . ."
Ann. 76-2-405(1).

Utah Code

These sections, then, serve as

justifications for the use or threatened use of force under
particular circumstances.

By their plain terms, however, they

do not serve as justifications for possession of a dangerous
weapon, the crime of which defendant was convicted.

Nor were

the other requirements of the statutes supported by any
evidence.

Where defendant was not charged with threatening or
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using force against another, his requested instructions were
not only superfluous, but carried the potential for
obfuscation as well.
(Utah App. 1993).

See State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 471

Consequently, the trial court correctly

refused to give them.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm
defendant's second and third degree felony convictions for
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person.
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

n.
JAMES DEITER,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM
DECISION
CASE NUMBER: 961000159
DATE: September 9, 1997
JUDGE BENHHADFIELD

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion for New Trial and
Motion to Reduce Con i Ictic: n The Court has considered these motions as well as the supporting
authorities and documentation and the opposition filed b) the Pi • z secution

\ heai iiig was held

concerning the motions on August 11, 1997. The Court took this matter under advisement to
receive additional authorities from counsel. No additional authorities were submitted.
The Defendant moves the Court for a new trial on the basis that there was insufficient
n'liuJrim tor Ihr trier mt lai I I ceasonabl) torn hull Illiiil Nit' M In iiiLiiiiil \ is in possession m i
firearm. This case is unique in that a firearm was not actually recovered from the Defendant.
There was, however, unrebutted evidence that the Defendant, on the night in question, contacted
the law enforcement dispatcher concerning a disturbance and threatened to "blow a hole" in
Si iiiG\~fiit; i( tin;) entered his liui • Tlii^ linen wa& repeated HI several variations. When officers
arrived at Defendant's home, they observed Defendant in the front loorwaj and on the front poi cli
holding what appeared to be a .22 caliber rifle. They were not aware of his parole status and so
simply instructed him to put the gun away. Some time later, during a search of Defendant's home
by his parole officer, 1ive 22 ammunition was recovered from the residence. There is sufficient
evidence for a jury to link these facts togethe i and i: easonablj con ::li ide that the Defendant was in
possession of a firearm.
The Defendant next requests that he be granted a new trial due to the Court's error in
refusing at trial to allow defense counsel to question the witness, Dale Smith, an officer of Adult

ie
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Probation and Parole, concerning whether he had ever authorized Defendant to have possession
of a bow and arrows. Upon a review of the arguments, the Court is persuaded that it's ruling at
trial was in error in preventing counsel from asking the question. However, the error does not
work the harm which Defendant alleges in his motion, in part because Defendant's motion mischaracterizes the testimony of Dale Smith. At the sentencing hearing on June 3, 1997, Dale Smith
was sworn and examined by defense counsel. The Court has reviewed a transcript of that
testimony. Dale Smith did not admit that he ever authorized and consented for the Defendant to
possess a bow and arrows. The Defendant's, arguments in this regard are erroneous. Dale Smith's
answer, under oath, was equivocal. He stated he did not recall ever giving such permission. Such
testimony would not establish that Defendant had been given permission.
The strongest testimony Defendant had concerning the question of permission, was
Defendant's father, Nelson Deiter, who testified at the sentencing hearing that Agent Smith had
given permission for possession of a bow and arrows. The Court made no ruling at trial"
prohibiting Defendant from placing Nelson Deiter on the stand and providing such testimony. The
Defendant chose not to call Mr Nelson Deiter as a witness. Inasmuch as any testimony which
would have been received from Dale Smith at trial was at best equivocal, and inasmuch as
Defendant was not prohibited from calling Nelson Deiter, who would have provided the much
stronger evidence, the Court believes no reversible error has occurred.
The Defendant's Motion for New Trial is denied.
The Defendant has also filed a Motion to Reduce Conviction, lowering degree of offense,
pursuant to UCA 76-3-402. The Court has reviewed said section and notes that it is couched in
terms of pre-sentence. The closing lines of Subsection 1 state "...the Court may, unless otherwise
specifically provided by law, enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense
and impose sentence accordingly."
There is no provision in the statute for the processing or granting of such a motion
following entry of the judgment. In the present case, the Defendant was sentenced to prison on
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concurrent sentences for both convictions. Once the sentence is imposed and the judgment
sentencing Defendant to prison is entered, this Court loses jurisdiction over the Defendant and he
i1,

MICH

under the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons. In the present case, the sentence was

pronounced on June 3,1997. The Judgment and Conviction was signed h\ ilie Cowl «> i Junk I,
1997. The Motion for Reduction of Sentence was signed by defense counsel June 6, 1997, and
filed with the Court on June 10, 1997. The Court is sympathetic to the arguments made in
support of the motion and would very possibly be disposed to grant the motion with regards to the
3rd Degree Felony conviction if this Coui t: had jurisdiction. Inasmuch as jurisdiction no \ l lies
with the Board of Pardons, the Defendant must appeal to that body for any relief which would be
in effect similar to the relief granted by a 402 motion.
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